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Abstract—In this letter, improving the security of an intelligent
reflecting surface (IRS) assisted multiple-input single-output
(MISO) communication system is studied. Different from the
ideal assumption in existing literatures that full eavesdropper’s
(Eve’s) channel state information (CSI) is available, we consider
a more practical scenario without Eve’s CSI. To enhance the
security of this system given a total transmit power at transmitter
(Alice), we propose a joint beamforming and jamming approach,
in which a minimum transmit power is firstly optimized at
Alice so as to meet the quality of service (QoS) at legitimate
user (Bob), and then artificial noise (AN) is emitted to jam the
eavesdropper by using the residual power at Alice. Two efficient
algorithms exploiting oblique manifold (OM) and minorization-
maximization (MM) algorithms, respectively, are developed for
solving the resulting non-convex optimization problem. Simula-
tion results have been provided to validate the performance and
convergence of the proposed algorithms.
Index Terms—physical layer security, intelligent reflecting
surface, secrecy rate, oblique manifold
I. INTRODUCTION
Intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) is proposed as a promis-
ing energy-efficient and cost-effective technology for re-
configuring wireless propagation environment via software-
controlled reflection. Specifically, IRS is a planar surface com-
prising a large number of low-cost passive reflecting elements,
each of which is able to change the phase for the incident
signal independently, thereby collaboratively achieving passive
reflect beamforming. IRS has been recognized as a strong
candidate for the future wireless network [1].
Motivated by these advantages, IRS is recently combined
with physical layer security (PLS) to deal with secure com-
munication. By adjusting phase shifts coefficients at IRS, the
signals reflected by IRS can add constructively with those
from direct path to enhance the desired signal power at the
legitimate user (Bob), and destructively with those from direct
path to reduce the signal power at the eavesdropper (Eve). As
a consequence, Bob’s signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is increased
while Eve’s is decreased and hence a higher secrecy rate can
be achieved. Several algorithms were established to maximize
the secrecy rates of IRS-assisted MISO transmission, including
single user case [2]-[5] and multi-user downlink case [6]. In
[7], the secrecy rate of an IRS-assisted MIMO wiretap channel
was studied for the first time. All these studies indicate that
by jointly optimizing the active transmit beamforming at the
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transmitter (Alice) and passive reflect beamforming at IRS,
Bob’s secrecy performance can be greatly enhanced.
However, all these aforementioned works are simply based
on an ideal assumption that Eve’s channel state information
(CSI) is perfectly known, which is not practical since Eve is
usually hidden and passive who does not actively exchange
CSI with Alice. Therefore, all the proposed secrecy schemes
in [2]-[7] are invalid in the practical case. Motivated by this,
in this letter, we investigate IRS-assisted secrecy transmission
without eavesdropper’s CSI. The main innovations and contri-
butions are in three aspects:
1) We propose a joint beamforming and jamming scheme
to enhance security without eavesdropper’s CSI, where we
minimize the power of confidential signal to meet the quality
of service (QoS) at Bob and allocate all residual power to
transmit artificial noise (AN) to jam the eavesdropper.
2) We propose an oblique manifold (OM) algorithm to
solve the non-convex optimization problem. A minorization-
maximization (MM) algorithm is also investigated.
3) Compared to the full CSI case, security could still be
guaranteed by increasing of QoS threshold at Bob as well as
the number of reflecting elements at IRS. The performance of
OM algorithm is better than of the MM algorithm.
Notations: For a vector a = [a1, · · · , an], ||a|| denotes
the Euclidian norm, diag(a) denotes a diagonal matrix whose
entries are a1, · · ·, an, and unt(a) =
[
a1
|a1|
, a2|a2| , · · · ,
an
|an|
]T
;
λmax(A) and tr(A) denote maximum eigenvalue and trace of
matrix A, respectively; arg(a) and ℜ{a} denotes phase and
real part of a; E {·} denotes statistical expectation; ◦ denotes
Hadamard product between two matrices.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider an IRS-assisted communication system, which
consists of Alice, Bob, Eve, and an IRS shown in Fig. 1. We
assume that Alice is equipped with Nt antennas, both Bob
and Eve are equipped with a single antenna, and the IRS has
L reflecting elements. We consider a quasi-static flat-fading
channel model. Without eavesdropper’s CSI, we propose a
joint beamforming and jamming scheme where Alice sends
both information and AN signals concurrently. The received
signals yB, yE at Bob and Eve can be expressed as
yB = (h
H
IBQHAI + h
H
AB)(wx+ na) + ξB , (1)
yE = (h
H
IEQHAI + h
H
AE)(wx+ na) + ξE , (2)
where w,na ∈ CNt×1 represent the transmit beamformer and
AN at Alice, Q , diag(ejθ1 , ejθ2 , · · · , ejθL) is the phase
shift matrix, θi is the phase shift of i-th reflecting element,
Fig. 1. An IRS-assisted MISO communication system
HAI ∈ CL×Nt,hIB ∈ CL×1,hIE ∈ CL×1,hAB ∈ CNt×1
and hAE ∈ CNt×1 represent channels from Alice to IRS,
IRS to Bob, IRS to Eve, Alice to Bob and Alice to Eve, x
is the transmitted signal following E
{|x|2}=1, ξB , ξE are
additive complex white Gaussian noises in which the entries
are with zero-mean and variances σb
2 and σe
2 at Bob and Eve
respectively. For briefly, we denote hHB , h
H
IBQHAI + h
H
AB
and hHE , h
H
IEQHAI + h
H
AE . Obviously, the achievable
secrecy rate in this scheme is
CS ,
[
log
(
1 +
|hHBw|2
σb2 + hHBRANhB
)
−
log
(
1 +
|hHEw|2
σe2 + hHERANhE
)]+
, (3)
where RAN , E
{
nan
H
a
}
. Given a total transmit power
budget PA at Alice, we have PA , PT + PJ , where
PT = ||w||2 and PJ , tr(RAN ) are signal power and AN
power, respectively.
III. JOINT BEAMFORMING AND JAMMING SCHEME
Different from the existing works in [2]-[7] that full CSI
is available at Alice, we consider a more realistic case where
although the equivalent legitimate channel hHB is known, both
hAE and hIE , i.e., h
H
E , are completely unknown. Therefore,
we could not directly maximize the secrecy rate (3). To
guarantee secure communication in this condition, the only so-
lution is to increase the information rate at Bob and decrease
the information leakage at Eve as much as possible. Hence,
inspired by the previous work in [8], two main procedures are
included in this joint transmission scheme. Firstly, we apply
AN signalling satisfying na ⊥ hHB , i.e., na is projected onto
the null space of the equivalent channel hHB , to jam Eve only.
Secondly, a minimum transmit power PT for the confidential
signal x is allocated to meet a target QoS constraint γ at Bob,
so that the residual power PJ = PA − PT can be as large as
possible to be used for AN to jam Eve. We can see that both
of the procedures will increase the secrecy rate as much as
possible, even without knowing Eve’s CSI.
Based on the above scheme, our objective is to minimize
PT = ||w||2 by optimizing w and Q, subject to QoS
constraints γ at Bob, as expressed by P1:
P1 : min
w,Q
PT , s.t.
| (hHIBQHAI + hHAB)w|2
σb2
≥ γ, (4)
We have to note that,Q is a diagonal matrix with each element
satisfying the unit modulus constraint |qi| = 1 since IRS only
changes the phase of the signal. The non-convex constraint (4)
then makes P1 a non-convex optimization. However, P1 can
be equivalently transformed to a single variable optimization
problem as follows. Firstly, it is obvious that the optimal solu-
tion must make (4) hold with equality. Secondly, for any given
Q, it is known that only maximum-ratio transmission (MRT)
is the optimal w∗H , i.e., w∗H =
√
PT
h
H
B
||hB||
. Therefore, by
substituting w∗ into problem P1, one obtains that the optimal
minimum transmit power is expressed as P ∗T =
γσb
2
||hB||2
. As
such, minimizing PT is equivalent to maximizing ||hB||2, so
the optimization problem can be expressed by P2
P2 : max
Q
||hHIBQHAI + hHAB||2, s.t. |qi| = 1, ∀i, (5)
which can be further equivalently expressed as
P3 : min
q
qHAq− qHb− bHq, s.t. |qi| = 1, ∀i, (6)
where q , [q1, q2, ..., qL]
H , b , diag(hHIB)HAIhAB and
A , −diag(hHIB)HAIHHAIdiag(hIB). P3 is still non-convex
due to nonconvex constraint (6). In the following, we propose
two different algorithms to solve this problem.
A. Oblique Manifold Algorithm
In this subsection, we develop an Oblique Manifold (OM)
algorithm to obtain a suboptimal solution of P3. The optimiza-
tion over a manifold is locally analogous to that in Euclidean
space. The unit modulus constraint is handled directly by
manifold optimization theory [9]. There are some recent appli-
cations of manifold optimization in wireless communications
[10], [11]. In the following, we briefly introduce key steps of
OM algorithm.
Specifically, P3 can be equivalently transformed to the
following minimization formular
P4 : min
q
f(q) =
1
qH(−A)q+ qHb+ bHq s.t. (6). (7)
Hence, the search space of P3 is product of
M , {q ∈ CL : |q1| = |q2| = · · · = |qL| = 1} in the
complex plane, which is a Riemannian submanifold of CL
with the unit modulus constraint. To obtain the solution q,
three key steps are needed in each iteration of OM algorithm.
Firstly, the tangent space of manifold M at the point q is
defined as the space contained all tangent vectors of manifold
M at q [10]. The tangent space for M at qi is given by
TqiM =
{
z ∈ CM : [zqiH ]l,l = 0, ∀l ∈M
}
, (8)
where qi is the current iteration point, z is a tangent vector
at qi. The Riemannian gradient, i.e., gradqif , is denoted as
the tangent vector with the steepest increase of the objective
function, which is the orthogonal projection of the Euclidean
gradient ∇qif onto the tangent space TqiM. Therefore, the
Riemannian gradient at qi is given by
gradqif = ∇qif −ℜ{∇qif ◦ qi∗} ◦ qi , (9)
f ′(qi) = ∇qif = −2
−Aqi + b
(qiH(−A)qi + qiHb+ bHqi)2 ,
Secondly, after obtaining the Riemannian gradient gradqif ,
the optimization approaches designed for the Euclidean space
can be transplanted to oblique manifold. For instance, we can
employ conjugate gradient method with the update rule of the
search direction in the Euclidean space is given by
µi+1 = −∇qi+1f + αiµi , (10)
Here, µi denotes the search direction at qi and αi is chosen as
the Polak-Ribiere parameter [9] to achieve fast convergence.
αi = max
{
[f ′(qi+1)]
T · f ′(qi+1)
[f ′(qi)]T · f ′(qi) , 0
}
, (11)
However, µi and µi+1 in (10) lie in two different tangent
spaces TqiM and Tqi+1M, so the direction cannot be directly
searched. To solve this problem, an operation called transport
which maps µi from tangent space TqiM to Tqi+1M is
proposed. The vector transport is given by
Tqi→qi+1(µi) , TqiM 7→ Tqi+1M : (12)
µi 7→ µi −ℜ{µi ◦ qi+1∗} ◦ qi+1 ,
Analogous to (10), the update rule for search direction on
manifold is given by
µi+1 = −gradqi+1f + αiTqi→qi+1(µi), (13)
Thirdly, after determining the search direction µi at qi, we
employ the retraction to find the destination on the manifold.
The retraction for the search direction µi and step size ηi at
point qi is given by
Rqi(ηiµi) , TqiM 7→M : ηiµi 7→ unt(ηiµi) , (14)
ηi = −ηi−1 [f
′(qi)]
Tdi
[f ′(qi − ηi−1di)]Tdi − [f ′(qi)]Tdi
where di represents the search direction in the Euclidean
space, i.e., di = −f ′(qi) + αi−1di−1.
With these key steps introduced above, the final OM algo-
rithm for solving P4 is summarized as Algorithm 1. According
to [9], Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to converge to a critical point
of P3, i.e., the point where the Riemannian gradient of the
objective function is zero.
B. Minorization-Maximization Algorithm
In this subsection, we apply MM algorithm to solve P3. The
key idea of MM is to firstly obtain an approximately upper
bound of the objective function and then iteratively compute
the optimal value of this bound subject to constraints. Then
the converged point is a local optimal point [7].
Specifically, let qk be a feasible point in current iteration
satisfying (6), an upper bound of the objective function at the
next iteration point qk+1 is expressed as
qHk+1Aqk+1 − qHk+1b− bHqk+1
≤qHk+1λmax(A)Iqk+1 − 2ℜ
{
qHk+1[λmax(A)I −A]qk
}
+ qHk [λmax(A)I−A]qk − 2ℜ
{
qHk+1b
}
=2Lλmax(A)− 2ℜ
{
qHk+1β
}− qHk Aqk , (15)
Algorithm 1 Oblique Manifold Algorithm
1. Set initial point q0 and convergence accuracy ǫ = 10
−4;
2. Set q = q0 and η0 ∈ (0, 1), calculate d0 = µ0 = −∇q0f ;
repeat
3. Calculate search step size ηi according to (14);
4. Find the next point qi+1 using retraction in (14):
qi+1 = Rqi(ηiµi) = unt(qi + ηiµi);
5. Determine Riemannian gradient gradqi+1f in (9);
6. Calculate transport Tqi→qi+1(µi) according to (12);
7. Calculate Polak-Ribiere parameter αi in (11);
8. Compute conjugate search direction µi+1 with (13);
9. i← i+ 1
until convergence, i.e, ||gradqif ||2 ≤ ǫ
where β , (λmax(A)I − A)qk + b. Hence, after dropping
the constant term in (15), P3 can be approximated to P5
P5 : max
qk+1
ℜ{qHk+1β} s.t. (6) , (16)
Clearly, ℜ{qHk+1β} is maximized only when the phases of qi
and βi are equal, where βi is the i-th entry of β. Therefore,
the closed-form optimal solution to problem P5 is
qk+1 =
[
ejarg(β1), ejarg(β2), · · · , ejarg(βL)
]
, (17)
Then let k = k+1 and update qk iteratively until the objective
function converges. By initializing a feasible point q0 and
applying MM algorithm to solve P3 iteratively, a local optimal
solution of Q for P3 can be obtained.
C. AN Signalling Strategy
Once P1 is solved, the residual power PJ = PA − P ∗T is
utilized for AN signalling in the null space of hB . Recalling
(3), since the CSI of hIE and hAE is completely unknown,
it is impossible to optimize the transmit covariance RAN to
minimize the leakage rate. Hence, we use isotropic signalling
with equal power allocation to transmit the AN signals in each
dimension of null(HB), where HB = hBh
H
B . HB is a rank-1
matrix so that the dimension of null(HB) is Nt − 1. Hence,
the transmit covariance for AN can be formulated as
RAN =
PA − P ∗T
Nt − 1 UANU
H
AN , (18)
where the columns in the semi-unitary matrix UAN are all
Nt−1 eigenvectors corresponding to zero eigenvalues of HB .
Therefore, by substituting the solution w and Q of P1 as well
as (18) into (3), the final actual secrecy rate returned by this
joint transmission scheme can be obtained.
IV. SIMULATION RESULT
We set Nt = 5, PA = 5 dBm and σb
2 = σe
2 = −90
dBm. The small-scale fading of all the channels follows
the Rayleigh fading and the path loss model is given by
PL =
(
PL0 − 10ρ log10( dd0 )
)
dB, where PL0 = −30 dB
is path loss at reference distance d0 = 1 m, ρ is the path loss
exponent. In the simulation we set the path loss exponents
and distances of the Alice-to-IRS link, the IRS-to-Bob link,
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rate under Nt = 5. The results are averaged over 1000
randomly generated channels.
the IRS-to-Eve link, the Alice-to-Bob link, and the Alice-to-
Eve link as ρAI = 2, ρIB = ρIE = 2.5, ρAB = ρAE = 3,
dAI = 50 m, dIB = 6 m, dIE = 7 m, dAB = 48 m, and
dAE = 45 m, respectively.
The convergence of proposed algorithms is investigated in
Fig. 2 based on a round of randomly generated channels.
Note that both algorithms can guarantee convergence and MM
requires significantly less iterations than OM. Furthermore, a
larger L requires more iterations to converge due to the reason
that larger L leads to larger dimensions of Q. In addition,
the computational complexity of OM and MM algorithm
is O (L2) for each iteration, so OM which requires more
iterations needs more computational time than MM.
In Fig. 3, we can see that the QoS threshold γ and the
number of reflecting elements L impact significantly on the
achieved secrecy rate. In Fig. 3(a), we note security rate with
IRS is significantly larger than that without IRS. It is because
that IRS can supply reflected power to transmit signal, so the
Alice can allocate sufficient power for AN signalling and the
secrecy rate is increased. In addition, we note taht the secrecy
rate achieved by OM is larger than that by MM. This is due
to the fact that the optimized minimum power PT via OM
is less than that via MM. Hence, more residual power can
be allocated to AN signalling by OM to jam Eve, resulting
a higher secrecy rate. Furthermore, for the fixed total power
PA, increasing γ can increase secrecy rate greatly because the
legitimate information rate is significantly increased. However,
if γ is set to be high, no sufficient power is left for AN
signalling, so that the information leakage rate dominates and
the achieved secrecy rate goes down. Therefore we see the
important role of the power allocation tradeoff. As γ goes too
high such that the total available power PA can not support
such a γ, P1 becomes infeasible and the transmission fails.
In Fig. 3(b), we note that compared to the full CSI scenario,
although the secrecy rate without Eve’s CSI is decreased,
the security still can be guaranteed by the proposed scheme.
Furthermore, for the fixed PA, increasing L and γ will
increase security. This is because with L increasing, the IRS
can provide more reflection power to transmit signal. Hence
a sufficient higher γ can be supported to exchange more
information and more residual power can be allocated for AN
signalling to reduce information leakage. It also implies that
if the total power is limited, we can use more IRS to support
a sufficient large γ to improve the security performance.
We can see that there exists cross-point between the two
curves γ = 20 dB / 25 dB. It is because that L is small,
the reflected power is not sufficient. Hence if γ is set to 25
dB, Alice needs to allocate more power for signal transmission
and less power for AN singnalling, so the secrecy rate is lower
than that of 20 dB. As L is increasing, the reflected power is
sufficient to transmit signal, so the Alice can allocate more
power for AN signalling to enhance security. If L is sufficient
large, increasing γ can increase the legitimate information rate.
Hence when γ is 25 dB, the secrecy rate is higher than that
of 20 dB.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we proposed a joint beamforming and jamming
scheme to improve the PLS of an IRS-assisted MISO system
without eavesdropper’ CSI. OM and MM algorithms are
proposed to jointly optimize the transmit beamforming at Alice
and phase shifts at IRS. Simulation results have validated the
convergence of the proposed algorithms, and it is shown that
the joint scheme greatly improves the security.
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